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Women, Credit, and Dowry in 
Early Modern Italy
James E. Shaw
Introduction
In recent years the new history of capitalism has shifted attention away from pro-
duction and wage labour to emphasize the role of financialization. In this, special 
attention has been given to the role of money, understood in the broad sense of 
a social technology of credit.1 Historians have highlighted the emergence of new 
institutions, practices, and attitudes regarding money, profit, and exchange rela-
tions during the early modern period, which constituted a ‘financial revolution’.2 
Obtaining social status through ‘having a living’ rather than ‘getting one’, wom-
en’s investment played an important role in circulating capital within the broader 
 1 Ingham, The Nature of Money.
 2 Sklansky, ‘The Elusive Sovereign’.
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economy.3 Much of this scholarship has focused on England. Amy Erickson has 
argued that the specific condition of women under English law facilitated their activi-
ties as investors: for example, unmarried women could take decisions about invest-
ments without needing the approval of male guardians.4 Similarly, Judith Spicksley 
has made the case for the prominent role of single women as investors in England.5 
Although the financial agency of married women in England appears much more 
limited, due to the rules of coverture (see discussion elsewhere in this volume), there 
were ways around these restrictions in practice.6 Nevertheless, the exceptionality of 
England seems questionable when considered in comparative perspective.7
This article considers the case of Italian women and their role as creditors across 
the late medieval and early modern periods, with particular attention given to Ven-
ice. The first section outlines the dowry system and the restrictions and protec-
tions that this placed on women’s capital. Women possessed clear legal rights to 
separate property, but in practice they often exercised these through a process of 
negotiation with kin. Despite the restrictions of the usury laws, the commercial 
and financial institutions of Italian city-states offered many possibilities for women 
to invest money for profit. The second section considers the relative attraction of 
these opportunities for legitimate investment alongside informal moneylending, 
highlighting the profits and potential risks in each case. The third section uses 
a case study from early modern Venice to reveal how dowry litigation can reveal 
women’s financial agency even within the context of marriage.
Women and Capital
The roman law tradition that was diffused throughout Italy clearly recognized 
married women’s legal personhood. There were important local variations in imple-
mentation: in Florence, statutes tend to place limits on wives’ control of property, 
and women required a male representative in court;8 in Venice, state laws and 
 3 Shepard, ‘Crediting Women’, pp. 5–6. See also Hartigan-O’Connor, ‘Gender’s Value in 
the History of Capitalism’.
 4 Erickson, ‘Coverture and Capitalism’.
 5 Spicksley, ‘Women, “Usury” and Credit in Early Modern England’; Spicksley, ‘“Fly with a 
Duck in thy Mouth”’. See also Spicksley, this volume.
 6 Erickson, ‘Coverture and Capitalism’, p. 5; Fontaine, ‘Il posto delle donne’, p. 516.
 7 See for example the essays in Sperling and Wray, eds, Across the Religious Divide.
 8 Kuehn, ‘Daughters, Mothers, Wives, and Widows’, p. 105; Kuehn, ‘“Cum Consensu 
Mundualdi”’.
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institutions played a particularly active role in defending women’s property 
rights.9 Nevertheless, the general principle was that husbands and wives were sep-
arate persons who were not obligated for each other’s debts — instead, liability 
extended along the lines of the male lineage.10 Even during marriage, women often 
maintained separate finances to their husbands, and this was particularly the case 
if they had received separate bequests from former husbands, mothers or other kin 
— such wealth was considered separate from their dowries and not subject to a 
husband’s control.11 In Italy, married women were legally constituted as ‘passing 
guests’ in their husband’s household, rather than full members.12 A woman could 
not expect to inherit from her husband — by default the husband’s estate would 
pass to any children and then to other male kin. Formally speaking, wives were 
not joint partners in a family unit, but were legally separate from their husbands’ 
affairs.
The concept of women having separate property and legal personhood within 
marriage was expressed primarily through the laws of dowry.13 These were estab-
lished in the late medieval period: in 1143 in Genoa, for example, the widow lost 
her traditional right to one third of the couple’s estate; instead she could now ask 
only for return of her dowry, a precisely quantified sum that was independent of 
her husband’s fortunes.14 The dowry was regarded as a form of open-ended credit: 
although it was given to the groom to manage during the course of the marriage, 
the wife retained a residual claim on her husband’s estate. She (or her heirs) could 
demand that the dowry be repaid in the event of the dissolution of the marriage 
due to annulment, the separation of the couple, the death of either partner, or if 
the husband were verging on insolvency.15 Often governments put extensive legal 
protections in place to ensure that women could assert these claims. For example, 
in Venice, dowries had to be registered at a government office, and the groom and 
 9 Chojnacki, ‘Getting Back the Dowry’. See also Bellavitis, ‘Women, Family, and Property 
in Sixteenth-Century Venice’; Brizio, ‘In the Shadow of the Campo’, pp. 122–23; Sperling, 
‘Marriage, Kinship, and Property in Portuguese Testaments (1649–1650)’, p. 164.
 10 Kuehn, ‘Debt and Bankruptcy in Florence’, p. 359.
 11 Chojnacka, Working Women of Early Modern Venice, p. 32; McGough, ‘Women, Private 
Property, and the Limitations of State Authority’, p. 38.
 12 Klapisch-Zuber, ‘The “Cruel Mother”’, p. 118.
 13 Sperling and Wray, ‘Introduction’, pp. 6–7.
 14 Bezzina, Artigiani a Genova, p. 139.
 15 Kirshner, ‘Wives’ Claims against Insolvent Husbands in Late Medieval Italy’; Fontaine, 
‘Women’s Economic Spheres and Credit in Pre-Industrial Europe’, p. 19.
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his kin were expected to guarantee the return of the dowry by posting their own 
immovable property as collateral.16 In Italy, the wife was the number one creditor 
of her husband, her rights protected by law and state institutions, but her claim 
on his estate was limited to her dowry, rather than her being joint partner in the 
household.
The general process of dowry inflation taking place across the period had impor-
tant consequences for the role of women in finance. Dowries became more signifi-
cant not only due to their greater size, but also because they increasingly consisted 
of mobile, liquid wealth in the form of cash, material goods, and financial instru-
ments.17 By contrast, male inheritance increasingly consisted of real estate hold-
ings, whose use was often restricted by the use of fideicommissa (entails) designed 
to keep patrimonies intact.18 Women’s property was therefore particularly signifi-
cant as a key source of liquid assets that conditioned families’ marital and business 
strategies. In Renaissance Florence, the memoirs of Gregorio Dati make clear how 
his business opportunities were tied to his control of dowry assets through succes-
sive marriages.19 For the parents of elite brides, putting the dowry together could 
require significant investment activity. In Florence, for example, the state dowry 
fund encouraged families to start saving for dowries when their daughters were still 
young, channelling this capital into government debt.20 Judith Spicksley has shown 
how single women in England were frequently active in moneylending, usually for 
the purpose of augmenting their marriage portion.21 In Italy, women’s dowries 
were larger, and savings were usually started earlier by fathers on behalf of their 
daughters, with control of the funds subsequently passing to husbands on marriage. 
Women’s capital played a key role in Italian society, but it was typically managed by 
men on their behalf.
 16 Bellavitis, ‘Women, Family, and Property in Sixteenth-Century Venice’ pp. 176–77; 
Lanaro, ‘La restituzione della dote’, p. 766; Chojnacki, ‘Patrician Women in Early Renaissance 
Venice’; Chojnacki, Women and Men in Renaissance Venice, pp. 128–29; Ambrosini, ‘Penom-
bre femminili’, p. 307; Ferraro, Marriage Wars in Late Renaissance Venice, pp. 136, 146.
 17 Bellavitis, ‘Women, Family, and Property in Sixteenth-Century Venice’; Lanaro and Vara-
nini, ‘Funzioni economiche della dote’, p. 94.
 18 Lanaro and Varanini, ‘Fidecommesso, doti, famiglia’. For comparison, see Zuijderduijn, 
this volume, pp. 111–12.
 19 Brucker, The Society of Renaissance Florence, pp. 29–31.
 20 Kirshner and Molho, ‘The Dowry Fund and the Marriage Market in Early Quattrocento 
Florence’; Molho, Marriage Alliance in Late Medieval Florence.
 21 Spicksley, ‘Women, “Usury” and Credit in Early Modern England’, pp. 265, 268–69, 271, 
274–75.
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Women’s financial agency was closely bound up with the life cycle, and was con-
ditioned by their family relations.22 Women generally only came to exercise direct 
control over their assets on widowhood, a situation which was particularly likely for 
elite families, where husbands tended to be older than wives. Nevertheless, women 
often found that the exercise of their legal rights was constrained by social obliga-
tions. Alessandra Sambo’s study of the Tiepolo family in seventeenth-century Ven-
ice shows how the legal rights of women might be overridden in practice. In 1637, 
Donata Tiepolo formally donated all her dotal property to her husband, but a week 
later she registered a ‘secret protest’ as proof that she had not done so voluntarily, 
a precautionary measure which enabled her to successfully contest the donation 
after his death.23 Similarly, for a widow, actually exercising the right to reclaim her 
dowry might involve her in bitter struggles with her husband’s kin and even her 
own children.24 To incentivize widows to make the ‘right’ choice, a husband might 
use his will to provide for his widow, and to appoint her as guardian of the chil-
dren, but on condition that she did not reclaim her dowry.25 As a result of such 
arrangements, many widows chose not to reclaim their dowries (and therefore not 
to remarry), instead administering their children’s financial assets on their behalf.26 
How dowry rights functioned in practice was a matter for negotiation, across both 
sides of the family and across generations.27
Another way in which Italian women expressed financial agency was through 
their wills.28 Through wills, women might abrogate the ordinary rules of succes-
sion, as in the case of Lippa, a Sienese widow of the late fourteenth century, who 
willed her house to her daughter and then down the female line of succession to her 
great-granddaughter.29 Women had considerable testamentary freedom to decide 
between the competing claims of their children from different marriages, their natal 
 22 Zuijderduijn, this volume, pp. 95–97.
 23 Sambo, ‘Strategie d’immortalità’, pp. 570–74. On the ‘secret protest’ see ‘Strategie 
d’immortalità’, pp. 578–81, and Shaw, ‘The Informal Economy of Credit’.
 24 Chabot, ‘Lineage Strategies and the Control of Widows in Renaissance Florence’; Kla-
pisch-Zuber, ‘The “Cruel Mother”’; Kuehn, ‘Daughters, Mothers, Wives, and Widows’, p. 110.
 25 Kuehn, ‘Daughters, Mothers, Wives, and Widows’, p. 111.
 26 Kuehn, ‘Daughters, Mothers, Wives, and Widows’, p. 109; Cecchini, ‘A World of Small 
Objects’, p. 43.
 27 Chojnacki, Women and Men in Renaissance Venice, pp. 130, 142; Queller and Madden, 
‘Father of the Bride’, p. 707; Cox, ‘The Single Self’, pp. 526–28.
 28 Chojnacki, ‘Patrician Women in Early Renaissance Venice’, pp. 183–85.
 29 Brizio, ‘In the Shadow of the Campo’, p. 125.
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and marital kin, and other social connections.30 The bequests made by women to 
their daughters contributed significantly to the dowry inflation of the late medieval 
period.31 Alternatively, women might find a valuable source of institutional support 
outside the family by making bequests to monastic and charitable institutions, and 
by appointing these institutions as their executors.32 Cattarina Conti, who litigated 
with her husband over control of her dowry, found refuge in the Venetian house 
of the Convertite. Through a subsequent bequest of 8000 ducats, she gave the insti-
tution a vested interest in ensuring that her will was executed.33 Such institutions 
could also provide a refuge for those without kin, as at the hospital of Santa Maria 
Nuova in Florence, where widows could invest sums to obtain residency rights as 
well as modest pensions to support them for the rest of their lives.34 Testamentary 
agency was exercised by married women as well as by widows. In Venice, husbands 
were not allowed to be present when married women drew up their wills, in order 
to prevent undue influence.35 Women’s relative freedom as testators can be con-
trasted to the case of men, who were legally obliged to meet the claims of male heirs 
and also to make provision for their daughters; they had to be able to meet the 
dotal claims of their wives and those of their male kin; and their freedom of action 
was further limited by fideiussory controls on landed property.
Although women’s financial agency became manifest on widowhood, women 
could also exercise a degree of informal control over their assets within marriage.36 
In Venice, similar proportions of widows, married women, and spinsters had deal-
ings with notaries across the period 1565–1625.37 Married women had the faculty 
of making their will independently of their husband, and they could administer any 
separate nondotal property they had received through bequests or gifts.38 In addi-
tion, married women might exercise informal influence over their dotal assets even 
 30 Lanaro and Varanini, ‘Funzioni economiche della dote’, pp. 99–102.
 31 Queller and Madden, ‘Father of the Bride’, pp. 695–97.
 32 Cavallo, Charity and Power in Early Modern Italy; McGough, ‘Women, Private Property, 
and the Limitations of State Authority’; Carbonell-Esteller, this volume, p. 317.
 33 McGough, ‘Women, Private Property, and the Limitations of State Authority’, pp. 41–43.
 34 Chabot, ‘Widowhood and Poverty in Late Medieval Florence’, p. 300.
 35 McGough, ‘‘Women, Private Property, and the Limitations of State Authority’, pp. 37–
38; Sambo ‘Strategie d’immortalità’, p. 576.
 36 Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’, p. 23.
 37 Chojnacka, Working Women of Early Modern Venice, pp. 41–42.
 38 Kirshner, Marriage, Dowry, and Citizenship, pp. 83–85.
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within marriage.39 In fifteenth-century Florence, the wife of Tommaso Dati sold a 
piece of land to a widow despite its being technically under her husband’s control.40 
Again, this would depend on the state of relations within the family. Chojnacki 
argues that a married woman’s residual right to reclaim the dowry gave her hus-
band, his kin, and any children of the relationship an incentive to treat her well, in 
the hope that she would choose not to exercise those rights in the future.41
Although the default legal position was that Italian wives had rights to separate 
property, this did not preclude marriage from functioning as a form of partnership. 
Indeed, couples could exploit the privileged legal status of the dowry as a means of 
limiting their liability for debts.42 For this reason, in thirteenth-century Pavia, cred-
itors often insisted that wives assume liability along with their husbands, acting as 
guarantors of the debt, and similar practices can be found in seventeenth-century 
France.43 In effect this meant that wives might be involved in transactions as part-
ners along with their husbands, at least at the level of giving their formal assent.44 In 
similar fashion, mothers often helped their male children to raise capital by guar-
anteeing their debts.
Although these sorts of guarantees might imply a merely passive role, in which 
women assumed liability through a sense of familial obligation, there are also cases 
showing a more direct sense of active partnership, as for example when wives also 
acted as agents for their husbands when the latter were away on commercial or 
other business.45 Christine de Pisan wrote that because husbands were often away, 
their ‘wives should be wise and sound administrators and manage their affairs well 
[…] They should have all the responsibility of the administration and know how 
to make use of their revenues and possessions’.46 In late medieval Genoa, wives 
often represented their husbands in commercial dealings,47 and the sorts of prac-
tical business skills that might be developed by patrician women are exemplified 
 39 Chojnacka, Working Women of Early Modern Venice, p. 29.
 40 Kuehn, ‘Daughters, Mothers, Wives, and Widows’, p. 107.
 41 Chojnacki, Women and Men in Renaissance Venice, pp. 128–29; Ambrosini, ‘Penombre 
femminili’, p. 307; Bellavitis, ‘Dare credito’, p. 265.
 42 Bellavitis, ‘Dare credito’, p. 265; Erickson, ‘Possession’, p. 371.
 43 Bertoni, ‘Investire per la famiglia’, pp. 55–57; Fontaine, ‘Il posto delle donne’, p. 516.
 44 Fontaine, The Moral Economy, pp. 131, 135–36.
 45 Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’, pp. 20–23.
 46 Christine de Pisan, The Treasure of the City of Ladies, p. 130, quoted in Laurence, Maltby, 
and Rutterford, eds, Women and their Money, 1700–1950, p. 11.
 47 Bezzina, Artigiani a Genova, pp. 92, 95.
180 James E. Shaw
by the case of Ginevra Lomellini, who (according to Boccaccio) could ‘read, write 
and cast up accounts better than as if she were a merchant’.48 In Prato, Margherita 
Datini worked in close partnership with her husband, the merchant Francesco, act-
ing as his agent when he was away on business, negotiating with debtors, learning 
to write, and to keep financial records.49 This sense of partnership was particularly 
strong among mercantile and artisan households, where wives could gain practi-
cal experience in managing the business along with their husbands, often continu-
ing the activity as widows after their deaths. Among artisan families, in fact, it was 
typical for husbands to name their wives as their executors and heirs, recognizing 
them as partners in the household despite the theoretical separation of property 
rights.
Women as Investors
Women’s key role as creditors should be understood as a result of the gender struc-
tures of the economy — significant amounts of liquid capital were concentrated in 
the hands of women, but they played a marginal role in direct management of busi-
nesses. Denied socially respectable alternatives in the productive economy, women 
were generally obliged to invest capital in ventures organized by men. Women’s 
prescribed role was to manage the household assets, including consumption, sav-
ings, and investment — family honour required the seclusion of women from 
public life: as Leon Battista Alberti noted, ‘it would hardly win us respect if our 
wife busied herself among the men in the marketplace, out in the public eye’.50 For 
women, a key marker of social status was not having to work for a living — this 
marked the divide between the working classes and the ‘better sort’, which included 
not just the nobility but also women of middling status.51 Although many working 
class women worked in craft production, they were generally confined to the lower 
levels of the economy, typically working from home in putting-out systems of 
spinning, weaving, knitting, and lace-making that became prevalent in the early 
 48 Boccaccio, Decameron, trans. J. M. Rigg, ii, 9. See Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’, 
p. 15; Vitullo, ‘Femininity in the Marketplace’.
 49 Crabb, ‘Gaining Honor as Husband’s Deputy’; Crabb, ‘“If I could write”’.
 50 Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence, p. 20, quoted in Matchette, ‘Women, Objects, 
and Exchange in Early Modern Florence’, p. 245.
 51 Ambrosini, ‘Penombre femminili’, p. 309, Chojnacka, Working Women of Early Modern 
Venice, p. 47.
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modern period. Lacking any guild protection or representation, women’s labour 
was cheap and easily exploited by male-controlled merchant capital.52
Despite the theoretical restrictions of the usury laws, which remained in force 
across the period, there were many legitimate channels in which women could invest 
for profit. This was a strongly financialized and mercantile society in which specific 
types of investment were recognized as legitimate by governments, lawyers, and by 
the church. These included for example equity investment in business partnerships 
(where the interest was justified in terms of the risk), mortgages and annuities on 
collateral of real estate (where the interest was presented as ‘rent’), and government 
bonds (where the interest could be justified in terms of a gift in return for patriotic 
duty, and to cover the opportunity cost of investment). In the sixteenth century it 
also became possible to invest in charitable loan-banks called Monti di Pietà, which 
were able to raise capital more easily by paying interest to depositors.53 The devel-
opment of such systems over time has been described as a ‘savings revolution’,54 and 
the growing supply of capital was reflected in the decline of interest rates across the 
period, falling to around 5–6 per cent in the seventeenth century and subsequently 
to 3–4 per cent in the eighteenth century.55
Before these sorts of credit instruments became widely accessible, significant 
numbers of women were able to invest in business ventures through commenda 
contracts.56 These were an effective way of facilitating the flow of capital into 
entrepreneurial activity, developed in the commercial republics of medieval Italy 
and probably following models used in the wider Mediterranean.57 These enabled 
women to become passive investors in medium-term business ventures, invest-
ing capital but leaving the active management of the business to a male business 
 52 Allerston, ‘An Undisciplined Activity?’; Della Valentina, ‘The Silk Industry in Venice’; 
Caracausi, ‘Beaten Children and Women’s Work in Early Modern Italy’; Goldthwaite, The 
Economy of Renaissance Florence pp. 324, 338, 372.
 53 Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, p. 472. See also Carbonell-Esteller, this 
volume, pp. 303–04.
 54 Carter and Goldthwaite, Orpheus in the Marketplace, p. 355;Vaquero Piñeiro, ‘I censi con-
segnativi’, p. 91; Muldrew, ‘From Credit to Savings?’, p. 394.
 55 Pezzolo, ‘L’economia’, p. 423; Munro, ‘Usury, Calvinism, and Credit in Protestant Eng-
land’, pp. 17–18; Homer and Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, p. 140; Corazzol, Livelli stipulati, 
p. 30.
 56 Angelos, ‘Women in Genoese commenda Contracts, 1155–1216’.
 57 González de Lara, ‘The Secret of Venetian Success’; Koehler, ‘Islamic Finance as a Pro-
genitor of Venture Capital’; Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early 
Trade’.
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partner (often a relative). In early thirteenth-century Genoa, women constituted 
over 20 per cent of investors in such contracts.58 Similarly, in Pavia in 1292, Tisina 
Isimbardi invested money in a merchant venture, for a 50/50 share of the profit 
and the loss.59 In Messina in 1473, two noblewomen invested capital in the form 
of precious fabrics in a commercial venture to Catalonia made by Giovanni Pitti.60 
There are even examples from thirteenth-century Venice of married women invest-
ing capital separately from their husbands.61
In similar fashion, women might also invest in the craft industries, retail trades, 
and service sector. In fifteenth-century Rome for example, women were prominent 
in investing capital and also acting as managers of inns and taverns,62 and similar 
cases exist in Naples and Aversa.63 Often such investments were made by widows 
wishing to carry on their husbands’ business. An example is Caterina Pirogallo in 
early seventeenth-century Milan, who took legal action to get control of the estate 
of her husband, a bookseller and publisher. Subsequently she formed a partnership 
with her husband’s former business associate in order to run the business, which 
included four shops.64 Although Caterina had probably picked up practical knowl-
edge through working with her husband, it is typical of such cases that she found it 
necessary to work with a male partner. When a woman obtained restitution of her 
dowry in the form of the former husband’s shop, she typically got men to manage 
this in practice.65
There were often high returns associated with such investments, but also addi-
tional risks — ventures might fail, and women might be liable for the company’s 
debts. Furthermore, women’s position as mostly passive investors meant that 
they might be exploited by the men directly involved in administration. In mid-
fifteenth-century Venice, Isabetta Pessato was convinced to shift her investments 
from the government debt into a drapery business, where she obtained a return of 
18 per cent. However, Isabetta’s businesses partners cheated her by concealing the 
 58 Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’, p. 16; Bezzina, Artigiani a Genova, p. 95.
 59 Bertoni, ‘Investire per la famiglia’, p. 65.
 60 Figliulo, ‘Lo spazio economico dei mercanti messinesi’, p. 766. See also Mulé, ‘Note sulla 
presenza femminili’, p. 173.
 61 González de Lara, ‘The Secret of Venetian Success’, pp. 254, 274.
 62 Ait, ‘Donne in affari’, pp. 61–70.
 63 Colesanti and Fragnoli, ‘Operatrici economiche’, pp. 67–68.
 64 Fregulia, ‘Stories Worth Telling’, pp. 125–26, and for similar cases, pp. 128–29.
 65 Fregulia, ‘Widows, Legal Rights, and the Mercantile Economy of Early Modern Milan’, 
p. 235.
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true extent of the profits, and it was only after many years that her son was able to 
obtain what was due through litigation.66 Unless they could scrutinize the accounts 
for themselves, women were vulnerable to being cheated by their business partners 
and agents.
Although women continued to participate in these more risky forms of invest-
ment into the early modern period, many women preferred safer alternatives.67 
One of these was the public debt. In late medieval Italy, republican governments 
in particular began to raise money for war through forced loans, whereby citizens 
were obliged to contribute to the public purse according to their means, but were 
subsequently compensated with interest.68 In Venice this system was established 
as early as 1207, with the funded debt or Monte Vecchio paying 5 per cent interest 
to creditors by the 1260s.69 Women were often prominent among such investors, 
given the importance of their dowries: in fourteenth-century Genoa, for example, 
women made up from around one half to two-thirds of all investors.70 By investing 
their dowries in the public debt, Genoese women could earn legitimate interest 
at around 8 per cent on long-term loans and do their patriotic duty at the same 
time.71 Such investments were not entirely free of risk: governments might suspend 
interest payments during wartime, and at such times the price of bonds on the sec-
ondary market could plummet.72 In 1509 Girolamo Priuli described the losses of 
those Venetians who depended on their income from the public debt, highlight-
ing the plight of widows and also of many ‘poor maidens and virgins’ whose dow-
ries were invested there.73 By the mid-sixteenth century, governments moved away 
from the forced loan system, finding that they could raise money more easily by 
offering competitive rates to investors. Rather than obliging citizens to buy bonds, 
the Venetian government increasingly raised money by selling fixed-term or life 
annuities to citizens who voluntarily made deposits at the Mint.74 This is unlikely 
to have made much difference to the gender balance of investors: in the Low 
 66 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 537.
 67 Kamenaga-Anzai, ‘Attitudes towards Public Debt in Medieval Genoa’, p. 259.
 68 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, pp. 454–58.
 69 Munro, ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp. 515–16; Mueller, The 
Venetian Money Market, p. 459.
 70 Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’, p. 18.
 71 Kamenaga-Anzai, ‘Attitudes towards Public Debt in Medieval Genoa’, p. 247.
 72 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, pp. 461–63, 472.
 73 Lizzul, ‘The Utility of Wealth in the Era of the Public Debt 1300–1500’, p. 284.
 74 Pezzolo, L’oro dello Stato, p. 175; Pezzolo, ‘L’economia’, pp. 418–20.
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Countries, where city governments raised money via annuities rather than forced 
loans, women were also prominent investors in the public debt.75
Another favoured means of investing wealth at a profit were censi contracts, 
which appeared in the fifteenth century, and became widespread from the 1530s.76 
Their popularity increased following their approval by a series of papal bulls, such 
as that of Nicholas V in 1452, which limited the interest rate to 10 per cent,77 and 
that of Pius V in 1569, which limited the interest rate to 7 per cent.78 Such contracts 
effectively allowed creditors to purchase the rental income on property as a kind of 
annuity. Although the rent might be paid in produce or cash, by the late sixteenth 
century such contracts were generally purely financial instruments. In fifteenth-
century Sciacca, the widow Flora was involved in numerous contracts of this sort.79 
In the 1530s, women of the Roman aristocracy were typically able to obtain around 
10 per cent per annum interest on such contracts.80 Like government bonds, censi 
were instruments for long-term investment, although the returns were relatively 
modest. They were open-ended contracts in which the creditor could not demand 
the return of the capital, and therefore attractive to investors seeking a perpetual 
or lifetime income stream.81 Although relatively secure in many ways, such con-
tracts were not entirely risk-free: creditors might struggle to obtain payment in the 
event of default, or if the property in question passed to another owner, potentially 
resulting in costly litigation.82
The legitimacy of censi made them a popular means of investment by religious 
institutions, including many convents. A survey of 1642 in Naples showed that 
convents drew the majority of their income from investments consisting largely of 
censi, a pattern also found in other regions of Italy.83 In 1724 the convent of San 
Vincenzo in Lodi loaned over 5700 lire to the Miccoli brothers in the form of a 
censo contract. In this case the bulk of the capital actually consisted of the dowry 
 75 Zuijderduijn, this volume, pp. 111–12.
 76 Vaquero Piñeiro, ‘I censi consegnativi’, pp. 61–64, 69; Colombo and Dotti, Oikonomia 
urbana, p. 33.
 77 Munro, ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution’, p. 524.
 78 Corazzol, Livelli stipulati, p. 31; Carter and Goldthwaite, Orpheus in the Marketplace, 
p. 164.
 79 Mulé, ‘Note sulla presenza femminili’, pp. 171–72.
 80 Vaquero Piñeiro, ‘I censi consegnativi’, p. 84.
 81 Vaquero Piñeiro, ‘I censi consegnativi’, pp. 72–73.
 82 Carter and Goldthwaite, Orpheus in the Marketplace, p. 166.
 83 Novi Chavarria, Sacro, pubblico e privato, pp. 65–66.
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of their niece, Lucia, which the convent loaned back to her uncles at interest — in 
this way her entry to the convent was paid for through a form of debt financing.84 
The long-term nature of censi contracts also made them popular instruments for 
making perpetual bequests to charitable and religious institutions, for example 
to say masses. In the seventeenth century, Agnese Ribeira, wife of the governor of 
Vigevano, left capital in the form of censi to the value of 48,000 lire to the city 
orphanage that she had founded, so providing for its long-term stability.85
Similar sorts of contracts could be used to lend money on security of any sort of 
income stream. In Rome, these included public offices, a form of investment that 
became popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.86 Public officials were 
able to obtain loans on the basis of selling their future income; or the purchase of 
an office might be financed like a company, with shareholders providing capital in 
return for a share of the profits. In 1521, Lucrezia Rocchi invested 50 gold ducats 
in a ‘company’ with Francesco Ceccoli, obtaining annual income from the ‘tenant’ 
of the office equivalent to 15 per cent interest.87 Typically such offices were in prac-
tice carried out by substitutes, who undertook to pay the ‘rent’ due to the owners 
in return for the proceeds.
In Northern Italy, alongside censi contracts, mortgage contracts called livelli 
were popular, in which the creditor purchased the title to the property and then 
leased it back to the debtor.88 In such contracts, the rights of creditors were bet-
ter protected, since they formally owned the land. Like censi, these were typically 
employed for safe, long-term investments that brought a modest return, and were 
therefore particularly popular with women investing dowries.89 In a sample of 
Venetian mortgages from 1591, 20 per cent of investors in mortgages were women 
and they provided 24 per cent of the capital invested. By contrast, women con-
stituted only 12 per cent of those using mortgages to borrow money, and they 
borrowed relatively small sums (just 11 per cent of the total capital).90 Compari-
son can be made with Gayton’s data for rural England in the next century, which 
 84 Colombo and Dotti, Oikonomia urbana, p. 116. See also Strocchia, Nuns and Nunneries in 
Renaissance Florence, p. 25. 
 85 Colombo and Dotti, ‘Social Configurations of Municipal Debt’, p. 62.
 86 Ago, Economia Barocca, pp. 191–92.
 87 Esposito, ‘Perle e coralli’, pp. 254–55.
 88 Corazzol, Livelli stipulati, pp. 13–14.
 89 Filippi, ‘Patrimonio, redditi e consumi del Convento di Santa Maria della Scala di Verona 
nel 1680 e nel 1724’, p. 71 n. 123.
 90 Corazzol, Livelli stipulati, p. 57.
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indicate that women constituted around 26 per cent of investors in mortgages.91 
Similarly, women made up a higher proportion of mortgage borrowers (17 per 
cent), typically linked to short-term needs for significant life events.92 In both cases, 
the data tend to confirm women’s role as investors rather than entrepreneurs.
With their extensive landholdings as collateral, religious institutions could also 
offer a sort of deposit banking service to small investors, paying modest returns. 
The monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore in Venice paid depositors around 5 per 
cent interest in the late sixteenth century. Those who used mortgage contracts to 
lend money to the monastery included the widow of a wool-worker who invested 
500 ducats, and a wool merchant who invested 10,000 ducats for the dowry of his 
daughter.93 Similarly, the hospital of Santa Maria della Scala in fourteenth century 
Siena functioned as a sort of bank that was particularly popular with women, pay-
ing 5–6 per cent interest.94
The popularity of these relatively safe forms of investment tends to confirm 
the picture of most women as passive investors, content with the modest gains that 
came from long-term investments and preferring to make use of established institu-
tions and agents in order to limit risk.95 Such conservatism was a rational response 
to women’s need to establish financial security for life, their lack of alternatives in 
the productive economy, and their goals of transmitting capital to their heirs.
Yet this is not the full picture of women’s role as creditors. Women could 
obtain higher returns through moneylending, typically advancing loans on security 
of material goods, an activity that was only theoretically limited to the government-
regulated pawnbanks. Although there were risks associated with this sort of illegal 
moneylending, lending money on pledge was relatively secure activity, given that 
the value of the collateral always exceeded that of the loans. In 1578 the Venetian 
woman Maddalena received a pair of breeches as pledge against a loan of 40 soldi.96 
She probably worked in partnership with her husband, a second-hand dealer, 
allowing her to sell off unredeemed pledges easily. Although such loans were often 
made without any documentation, contracts could also be manipulated to conceal 
the practice of usury. In fifteenth-century Trapani, the noblewoman Miraglia, a 
 91 Gayton, this volume, Table 6.5, p. 160.
 92 Gayton, this volume, Table 6.2, p. 150; pp. 154–58. 
 93 Corazzol, Livelli stipulati, pp. 97–98.
 94 Piccinni, ‘Conti correnti di donne presso l’ospedale senese di Santa Maria della Scala’, p. 124.
 95 On women’s conservatism, see Fisher, ‘Gender Differences in Personal Saving Behaviors’, 
p. 14; Fisher, and Yao, ‘Gender Differences in Financial Risk Tolerance’.
 96 Allerston, ‘The Market in Second-Hand Clothes’, p. 91.
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doctor’s wife, was involved in various contracts of this sort, involving fictitious sales 
and loans on pledge, which concealed short-term loans at interest rates from 7 to 
28 per cent.97 Similarly, the expertise of notaries in manipulating contracts helped 
women to evade the controls on usury in fifteenth-century Rome.98
In late medieval Europe, large numbers of Jewish women were involved in 
small-scale moneylending, often to Christian women.99 This was a reflection of the 
particular agency enjoyed by Jewish women to manage their property independ-
ently.100 The case of Richa is a striking example of this sort of activity from late 
sixteenth-century Venice. She was a female Jewish moneylender, resident in the 
Jewish ghetto but operating illegally, outside the official pawnbank system. She 
loaned small sums of money on pledge for short periods of time (from one week 
to a month), without any documentation. A network of Christian women acted as 
her agents, connecting Richa to clients throughout the parishes of the city, many 
of them women.101 Many Jewish women were also actively involved in managing 
pawnbanks in partnership with their husbands, as in fifteenth-century Trieste.102 
In fifteenth-century Trapani, Gaudiosa Sammi operated in close partnership with 
her husband Lucio in variety of commercial and financial operations, and after his 
death she continued to manage the business with her son.103 In an analogous case 
from fifteenth-century Perugia, Rema took over her husband’s pawnbank on his 
death with her son as junior partner — this arrangement probably reflected the 
practical experience Roma had previously developed in running the bank alongside 
her husband.104 Similar cases can be found in fifteenth-century Florence, Como, 
Pisa, and San Gimignano, reflecting the close involvement of Jewish women in 
business life.105 In other cases, however, as in Padua, Jewish women might act as 
passive investors who entrusted the management of their capital to male relatives 
who ran the pawnbanks.106
 97 Mulé, ‘Note sulla presenza femminili’, p. 170.
 98 Esposito, ‘Perle e coralli’, p. 248. See also Shaw, ‘The Informal Economy of Credit’.
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As the case of Richa suggests, the ties of credit often crossed ethnic boundaries. 
In fifteenth-century Trapani, various Christian women loaned money to Jews on 
pledge, as in 1433 when the widow Tommasa loaned 10 onze to the Jew Lucio 
Sammi on pledge of gold and silver objects.107 Similarly, the doctor’s wife Miraglia 
loaned money to a Jewish woman in 1463.108 In this way, Jewish moneylenders 
might raise their capital from Christian investors, including women.109 However, 
other cases suggest that Christian women might more directly involved in mon-
eylending, employing Jews as their financial agents. This was the case of Saretta 
Galignara in seventeenth-century Venice — she was a wealthy widow who used 
two male Jewish intermediaries to arrange significant loans (typically a thousand 
ducats at a time) on pledge of goods, typically silver and gold items.110
Women’s wealth was concentrated in mobile property rather than land, and 
this included material goods as well as cash. Particularly for women lower down the 
social scale, dowries were more likely to consist of material goods — rings, jewels, 
linens, furniture, and silverware were the main ‘repositories of wealth’ for house-
holds.111 Goods were a form of savings that might be converted to liquid cash as 
required: they could be sold relatively easily in the second-hand market, or pawned 
for cash. Rather than a fixed stock of possessions excluded from circulation, goods 
were readily used as a means of payment or as collateral.112
Material goods could themselves also be loaned out, as typically took place at 
neighbourhood level, helping those who needed a pledge. Often such loans took 
place on a friendly basis, without charging a fee, and were unrecorded, but it was 
also possible to rent goods out at a profit.113 In seventeenth-century Venice, Mari-
etta Vicentina rented a pair of sheets to Bortolo Filacanevo for one ducat per 
month, and he then pawned the sheets to raise cash.114 This was a perfectly legiti-
mate form of credit that could be practised openly, in contrast to the renting out 
of money. The main risk was that the borrower would fail to return the goods. In 
 107 Mulé, ‘Note sulla presenza femminili’, pp. 169, 172.
 108 Mulé, ‘Note sulla presenza femminili’, p. 170.
 109 See also Camerano, ‘Donne oneste o meretrici?’, p. 650.
 110 ASV, Piovego, b.34, 21 May 1670, Menachem Coen vs. Saretta Galignara.
 111 Shepard, ‘Crediting Women’, p. 16; Sperling and Wray, ‘Introduction’, p. 6.
 112 Ago, ‘Using Things as Money’; Storey, ‘Prostitution and the Circulation of Second-Hand 
Goods in Early Modern Rome; Allerston, ‘Clothing and Early Modern Venetian Society’; 
Matchette, ‘To Have and Have Not’; Matchette, ‘Credit and Credibility’; Fontaine, ‘Il posto 
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Rome, it was possible for women creditors to obtain protection for their property 
by registering such rental contracts with a notary, having the goods appraised by 
an expert, and with real estate as collateral.115 More normally, such arrangements 
were documented privately, with relatively little protection, and only extended to 
members of the local community. In Venice, creditors were able take their claims 
to the magistracy of the Signori di Notte al Civil, in order to reclaim their property, 
attempting to prove their case through witness testimony and private documenta-
tion. Through such mechanisms, material capital might be invested for profit, and 
in turn the goods might be used as collateral for cash loans in the pawnbroking 
sector.
Women played a key role in neighbourhood credit networks, not only as credi-
tors and debtors but also as intermediaries who helped to arrange loans for oth-
ers. This was a common feature of consumption loans at the neighbourhood level, 
in which women played a key role.116 In Florence, female street vendors played an 
important role as intermediaries enabling elite women to participate in networks 
of credit and exchange from their homes.117 Women played a similar role as inter-
mediaries in England, as in the case of Roberta Jones, a laundress and widow who 
arranged loans for others with the haberdasher and petty moneylender John Pope. 
More than 84 per cent of Pope’s pawnbroking loans (a quarter of his business) 
were arranged by women.118 Although the establishment of government-regulated 
pawnbanks tended to eat into the traditional practices of neighbourhood lending, 
women continued to play a role in the intermediation of such loans.119 For borrow-
ers, being seen going to a pawnbank could be a source of embarrassment, which 
might also damage one’s standing with other creditors. As a result, intermediaries 
played a prominent role in this sort of lending, many of them women. In Bolo-
gna, Genoa, and Milan, intermediaries called montiste, most of whom were women, 
advanced money to clients and pawned items on their behalf at the pawnbanks. In 
eighteenth-century Bologna, their activities came to be regulated — they were not 
to deposit more than ten pledges per day and they had to deposits sums as guaran-
tees of their correct behaviour.120
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Dowry Litigation and Women’s Agency
As previously mentioned, women were typically the creditors of their husbands, 
primarily through the dowry that they brought to the marriage. These rights were 
in theory protected in law, with a clear separation between the assets of husbands of 
wife. In practice, however, relations could be more ambiguous. As Paola Lanaro has 
emphasized, the formal record of the dowry might be manipulated: for example, 
the sums recorded as being received for the dowry might not actually be paid in 
full or on time.121 It was for this reason that in the mid-fifteenth century, Alberti 
advised prospective husbands on the need for caution in regard to the dowry, 
which should be: ‘middling in size, certain and prompt’ rather than ‘large, vague, or 
promised for an indefinite future’.122 Insisting that the wife’s relatives pay what they 
had promised might permanently damage relations. Conversely, husbands might 
falsify the value of dowries they had received, something that Francesco Guic-
ciardini recorded as having done for purposes of tax avoidance.123 In seventeenth- 
century Venice, Foscarina Memo was accused of artificially inflating the value 
of her property, in this way falsifying her own contribution to the partnership. 
The judges questioned witnesses closely as to whether the prices she had 
obtained for selling goods given to her by the husband were genuine or had been 
manipulated.124
For this reason, records of litigation can provide insights into the relative con-
tributions of husband and wife to a marriage, and how women might exercise 
financial agency in practice even within the marriage relationship. Many marital 
disputes turned on the question of dowry: its precise value might be contested, 
the groom’s family might claim that it had only been partially paid, and the wife 
might complain that her husband had failed to register and insure the dowry as was 
his legal and moral duty. Witnesses were often called upon to testify to the reality 
of the state of relations between the couple, and particularly about the assets that 
each party had brought to the marriage. Such testimony was essential if the dowry 
was not formally registered, but could also play a key role if the declared value of 
the dowry was contested.125 For example, Foscarina Memo (see above) tried to 
demonstrate that she was a woman of independent means, as evidenced by the 
 121 Lanaro, ‘La restituzione delle dote’, pp. 760–61.
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fact that she had used mortgage contracts to lend money to the monastery of San 
Giorgio Maggiore. By contrast, witnesses for the groom’s family tried to show that 
she was a poor woman who was financially dependent upon her husband, and that 
her dowry was entirely fabricated.126 In such disputes, the testimony of neighbours, 
servants, agents, and tradesmen could play a key part in constructing the credit of 
marital partners.
These issues can be seen in Venice in the case of Lucrezia Gentili, whose fourth 
husband Iseppo Bindoni brought a complaint against her in court. The couple 
had married in 1653, but by 1656 Lucrezia had left her husband’s house and was 
involved in litigation with him over her property, in particular the ‘gold, silver, 
coins and goods’ that she claimed were hers.127 The dispute turned on the precise 
value of her dowry, much of it consisting of material goods that were probably 
unredeemed pledges, including bracelets, earrings, gold rings, and silver cutlery, 
the value of which was declared in a ‘confession’ or receipt made by Iseppo. This 
sort of informal receipt was an alternative to the proper registration of the dowry 
with a notary, commonly practised as a way of saving money, although inferior as 
a form of legal proof. For a wife, this could be problematic, since such documenta-
tion might be contested.
Iseppo tried to demonstrate that the receipt was a fabrication, which he had 
signed solely due to Lucrezia’s undue influence over him. In order to show that 
Lucrezia’s dowry was much smaller than stated in the receipt, he presented various 
witnesses from the neighbourhood, many of them women, who described Lucrezia 
as a former washerwoman ‘from a race of poor and miserable people’, who had mar-
ried first a porter, then a galley musician, and then a ‘poor man’ called Cipriano 
Pasini. One woman described how Lucrezia and Pasini had lived miserably ‘on one 
meal a day and her children crying from hunger’. A former landlord described Luc-
rezia as a poor woman who couldn’t keep up with rent payments and had to pawn 
goods to cover her debts. In contrast to this picture of his wife’s poverty, Iseppo 
tried to show that he was well-off before the marriage, describing his house as being 
furnished ‘with all the things suitable for a gentleman’. Material goods were the 
visible sign of Iseppo’s credit.
Lucrezia defended herself ably, insisting that Iseppo ‘came to me with nothing 
and he had sold everything to second-hand dealers’, and that he had been living with 
a priest with whom he had litigated over the rent. By contrast, she painted a picture 
of herself as a respectable woman who had brought assets totalling more than 8000 
 126 Ferraro, Marriage Wars in Late Renaissance Venice, pp. 150–51.
 127 ASV, Piovego, b.33, 7 Aug 1657, Iseppo Bindoni vs. Lucrezia Gentili.
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ducats to the marriage. Lucrezia presented herself as a canny female investor. She 
described how her third husband Pasini had run a mercer’s shop in Corfu. Since 
he was often away in Venice to buy supplies, it was actually Lucrezia who ran the 
shops, selling goods on credit and lending money at 10 per cent interest to Vene-
tian officers stationed at Corfu. The couple subsequently moved to Venice, where 
Pasini ran a mercer’s shop, and Lucrezia continued to lend money — as she put it, ‘I 
invested money at profit and lent money to people I trusted’. Various witnesses tes-
tified to the extent of her investments. One witness described how ‘she was a well-
off woman equipped with goods and furnishings, and she also made loans of three 
hundred or four hundred ducats per person’. The nobleman Francesco Grimani 
described how Lucrezia had lent his mother the sum of 300 ducats on pledge of 
silver goods, at an interest rate of 10 per cent.
As in the case of Saretta Galignara (see above), Lucrezia made use of various 
intermediaries, such as the Jewish moneylender Giacob Sorzetto, who described 
how Lucrezia had loaned him money on pledge of two dresses. Paulina, wife of a 
salt-fish merchant, similarly described how Lucrezia had given her 200 ducats to 
lend to her ‘friend’, paid back with interest after a period of 3–4 months. The sec-
ond-hand dealer Battista Stabelin described how he sold goods on her behalf, and 
that her house was filled with ‘leather wall hangings […] beds, mattresses […] vari-
ous chains, earrings, bracelets and rings’, which were probably pledges. Indeed, her 
marriage to Iseppo, who was a comandador (auctioneer), would have given Lucrezia 
convenient access to goods put up for public auction, which she could exploit using 
her networks of women, second-hand dealers and Jews.
Conclusion
Women’s capital played a key role in a ‘savings revolution’ that extended across late 
medieval and early modern period. In Italy, although the ownership of liquid capi-
tal was concentrated in women’s hands, it was generally men who actively managed 
capital in the productive economy. The gendered roles of the economy and house-
hold made women into quintessential creditors, obliged to entrust their fortunes 
to the care of men: to husbands in the form of the dowry, to sons in their busi-
ness ventures, to governments through investing in public debt, and to merchants, 
shopkeepers and craftsmen as equity investors. Indeed, much of this investment 
was carried out on their behalf, as in the case of fathers investing in the dowries of 
their daughters, or husbands re-investing the capital in their own business affairs. 
Even as widows, women were often the shareholders and guarantors of the business 
ventures of male relatives.
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When women did obtain direct control of their capital, as in widowhood, their 
management of wealth tended to be relatively passive, with a preference for well-
established, legitimate forms of low-risk investment that secured them a modest 
income over the long term, such as annuities, mortgages, and public debt. As these 
avenues for investment opened up across the period, and particularly from the six-
teenth century, they appear to have substituted for women’s earlier participation in 
more short-term commercial ventures. Religious and charitable institutions were 
also favoured channels for investment: they could prosper by catering to women’s 
need for security and support outside their kin groups. For many women, such ben-
efits were often more important than maximizing returns. At the same time, women 
were also involved in low-level moneylending in the local community. These were 
often interest-free loans to kin, neighbours, and friends, including goods as well as 
cash, which cemented women’s position in the community and brought benefits in 
terms of mutual support.
Nevertheless, as recent work has emphasized, this is not the whole picture.128 
There are also examples of women acting in more entrepreneurial roles, including 
married women as well as widows. Women were often involved in moneylending, 
motivated not only by neighbourly solidarity, but by profit. Lucrezia Gentili, for 
example, demonstrated considerable agency in her moneylending activities, first in 
Corfu and then in Venice, lending significant sums of money on pledge, and mak-
ing strategic use of her marriage relations to dispose of goods. Sometimes, women 
were involved in petty consumption loans helping to tide people over a few weeks 
or months, as in the case of Richa the Venetian Jew, but Saretta Galignara and Luc-
rezia Gentili are distinctive as Venetian women who lent significant sums of money 
over longer terms.
When investing capital, women frequently made use of intermediaries or 
agents. In the formal sector of mortgages, annuities, and government debt, nota-
ries played a key role in helping women to invest their money, broker deals and 
to ensure that contracts conformed to the usury laws.129 In the informal sector of 
neighbourhood credit, women often played a key role in negotiating loans, as in 
the case of Richa, who used a network of Christian women as her agents to reach 
into the neighbourhoods of the city. Saretta Galignara on the other hand used male 
Jewish intermediaries to contract loans and collect payments. Reliance on agents 
detached women from the day-to-day difficulties of managing money and reduced 
some of the risks of incrimination. Yet detachment came with its own risks: agents 
 128 Petti Balbi, ‘Forme di credito femminile’.
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might exploit their position to defraud investors, and their access to sensitive and 
incriminating information about moneylending activities gave them the means to 
pursue a grudge. The extensive archives of litigation reveal something of these ten-
sions, indicating that women might be able to recover assets through legal action, 
but also the additional costs and delays involved.
Despite the laws protecting the position of women, they often had to struggle 
hard to assert their rights against the interests of husbands, children, and other kin. 
In looking for examples of women’s financial agency, scholars have given particular 
attention to the activities of widows, who emerge as the most visible level of wom-
en’s credit activities through their direct control of these assets. Yet within marriage 
too, women could exercise financial agency, protected by the clear laws establishing 
their right to separate property. Cases like that of Lucrezia Gentili reveal something 
of the negotiation of power within marital relations, and how a mutually advanta-
geous partnership might turn into an acrimonious dispute over the assets that each 
side had brought to the marriage. The records of marital and contract litigation 
have considerable potential to reveal more about the informal sector of economy 
and the ways in which women could also exercise financial agency within marriage, 
as well as outside it.
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